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Abstract—In this work, we adopt channel inversion power
control (CIPC) to achieve covert communications aided by a
full-duplex receiver. Specifically, the transmitter varies the power
and phase of transmitted signals as per the channel to the
receiver, such that the receiver can decode these signals without
knowing the channel state information. This eliminates the
required feedback from the transmitter to the receiver, which aids
hiding the transmitter from a warden. The truncated CIPC and
conventional CIPC schemes are proposed and examined, where
for truncated CIPC covert transmission ceases when the channel
quality from the transmitter to the receiver is low, while for
conventional CIPC covert transmission always occurs regardless
of this channel quality. We examine their performance in terms of
the achieved effective covert throughput (ECT), which quantifies
the amount of information that the transmitter can reliably
convey to the receiver, subject to the constraint that the warden’s
detection error probability is no less than some specific value.
Our examination shows that the truncated CIPC scheme can
outperform the conventional CIPC scheme due to this constraint.
Index Terms—Physical layer security, covert communications,
full duplex, artificial noise.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the ever-increasing use of the Internet of Things (IoT),
various types of small devices are becoming part of the
wireless connected world, whose overall goal is to improve
the quality of our daily life. In a wide range of application
scenarios, the security of IoT is a critical issue. For example,
in health-care systems, some wireless sensors collect patients’
health information such as heart rate and blood pressure. This
type of information is private and highly confidential and
hence a secure transmission is of a high demand. However, due
to broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the transmission in
IoT can be easily detected or eavesdropped on by unauthorized
users [1], [2].
Traditional security techniques offer protection against
eavesdropping through encryption [3], [4], guaranteeing the
integrity of messages over the air. However, it has been shown
in the recent years that even the most robust encryption
techniques can be defeated by a powerful adversary (e.g., a
quantum computer) [5]. Meanwhile, physical-layer security,
on the other hand, exploits the dynamic characteristics of the
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wireless medium to preserve the confidentiality of the trans-
mitted information in wireless networks [6]–[9]. We note that
both the conventional encryption and physical layer security
techniques cannot provide protection against the detection of
a transmission in the first place, which may disclose a user’s
critical information (e.g., exposing a user’s location informa-
tion). As such, hiding a wireless transmission in the first place
is widely required in some IoT applications, which is also
explicitly desired by government and military bodies. Against
this background, covert communications (also termed low
probability of detection communications) are emerging as new
and cutting-edge wireless communication security techniques,
which aim to enable a wireless transmission between two users
while guaranteeing a negligible probability of detecting this
transmission at a warden [10]–[15].
In the literature, the fundamental limit of covert communi-
cations over additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels
has been studied in [10]. It is proved that O(√n) bits of
information can be transmitted to a legitimate receiver reliably
and covertly in n channel uses as n → ∞. Following [10],
covert communications have been studied in a few scenarios.
For example, covert communications can be achieved when the
warden has uncertainty about the receiver noise power [16]. In
[17], the authors adopted a friendly jammer, which generates
artificial noise to create uncertainty at the warden Willie, in
order to help achieve covert communications. The authors of
[18] considered covert communications with a poisson field
of interferers, in which it was proved that the density and
the transmit power of the interferers do not affect the covert
communication performance when the network stays in the
interference-limited regime. The covert communication with
interference uncertainty from non-cooperative transmitters is
studied in [19]. The effect of finite blocklength (i.e., short
delay constraints) over AWGN channels on covert communi-
cations was examined in [20], which proves that the effective
throughput of covert communications is maximized when all
available channel uses are utilized. A covert communication
system under block fading channels was examined in [21],
[22], where transceivers have uncertainty on the related chan-
nel state information. Covert communications in the context
of relay networks was examined in [23], [24], which shows
that a relay can transmit confidential information to the corre-
sponding destination covertly on top of forwarding the source’s
message. In [25], the optimality of Gaussian signalling was
examined in the context of covert communications with two
different constraints, where Gaussian signalling was proved to
be optimal for one covert communication constraint, but not
2optimal the other one.
The aforementioned works in the literature mainly focused
on how to hide the wireless transmission action (not the
transmitter itself), since some information that can indicate
the existence of the transmitter was assumed a priori known.
For example, in [16], [20], [21], [23], [26] it is assumed
that the instantaneous wireless channels from the transmitter
to the warden are known by the warden, which means that
the warden knows the existence of the transmitter and is
to detect whether a wireless transmission occurs. We note
that the ultimate goal of covert communications is to achieve
a shadow wireless network [11], in which the transmitter
itself should be hidden from the warden. This is due to
the fact that the exposure of a user’s location information
will cause severe negative impact in some applications. For
example, when IoT is adopted in battlefields for commu-
nication, location information of soldiers or headquarters is
extremely confidential, since exposure of this information
may lead to fatal attack on the soldiers or headquarters. As
such, we aim at an initial step towards this ultimate goal of
covert communications by removing some strong assumptions
that reveal the existence of the transmitter a priori. In this
work, we adopt the channel inversion power control (CIPC)
at the transmitter (Alice) to achieve covert communications,
in which the transmitter varies the power and phase of its
transmitted signals as per the channel from itself to the receiver
(Bob) which as a known base station in order to keep the
signal power at the receiver equal to a certain constant value.
Such approach has the benefit of removing the requirement
that the receiver has to know the channel state information
(that requires the feedback from the transmitter) and thus
hiding the existence of the transmitter from warden (Willie)
before any covert information transmission. In a standard
(non-covert) communication system, channel inversion power
control can significantly decreases the outage probability [27].
It is well known that the truncated CIPC scheme is more
general, which includes the conventional CIPC scheme as a
special case with the maximum value of the transmit power
approaches the infinity and can achieve the minimum value
of the outage probability. However, when considering covert
communications, conventional CIPC scheme might make it
easy for the signal to be observed at Willie and hence its
utility is less clear, which motivates us to consider the these
two CIPC scheme and compare their performance in this work.
Moreover, the IoT device (e.g., Alice) is usually equipped with
a single antenna each and could not cooperation in the typical
application scenario of IoT [28]. As such, the receiver Bob
as more powerful base station can use an additional antenna
to transmit artificial noise (AN) for further degrading the
detection performance of Willie.
Our main specific contributions are summarized as below.
• Considering practical Rayleigh fading channels in wire-
less networks, in this work we adopt the CIPC at the
transmitter to achieve covert communications, in which
the transmitter varies its transmit power as per the channel
from itself to the receiver, such that the received power
of the covert information signal is a fixed value Q.
With channel reciprocity, this power control strategy does
not require the transmitter to transmit pilot signals for
channel estimation or to feed back the estimated channel
to the receiver before covert communications, which may
announce the existence of the transmitter before a covert
transmission. As such, this power control can potentially
aid hiding the transmitter and thus we adopt it in two
CIPC schemes to achieve covert communications in this
work, where its performance is thoroughly examined.
• We first consider the truncated CIPC scheme, where the
covert transmission ceases when the quality of the chan-
nel from the transmitter to the receiver is lower than some
specific value (determined by the maximum transmit
power constraint). We analyze the detection performance
at the warden, based on which we determine effective
covert throughput (ECT) that quantifies the amount of
information that can be conveyed from the transmitter
to the receiver subject to the warden’s detection error
probability being no less than some specific value. Specif-
ically, the detection error probability at the warden is
derived in a closed-form expression, based on which
the optimal detection threshold is analytically achieved.
The generated AN offers the capability of hiding the
transmitter. Our examination shows that the increase in
the maximum transmit power of AN at the full-duplex
receiver may not continuously improve ECT. This is due
to that the transmitted AN causes self-interference at the
receiver and the transmitter is subject to a maximum
power constraint.
• We also consider the conventional CIPC scheme as a
benchmark to examine the performance limit of CIPC
in an asymptotic scenario, where there is no maximum
power constraint at the transmitter and the covert trans-
mission always occurs regardless of the channel quality.
Solid performance analysis on this scheme has conducted,
since mathematically the conventional CIPC scheme can-
not be a special case of the truncated CIPC scheme. For
the conventional CIPC scheme, our analysis shows that
the value of Q can be varied to counteract the impact
of the transmit power of AN on the warden’s detection
performance and thus the achieved ECT approaches an
analytical derived upper bound as the maximum transmit
power of AN tends to infinity.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
details our system model and adopted assumptions. In Section
III, we examine the performance the truncated CIPC scheme
in the context of covert communications. Section IV presents
our analysis on the conventional CIPC scheme. Section V
provides numerical results to confirm our analysis and provide
useful insights with regard to the comparison between these
two schemes. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Notation: Scalar variables are denoted by italic symbols.
Vectors are denoted by lower-case boldface symbols. Given a
complex vector, (·)† denotes the conjugate transpose. Given a
complex number, | · | denotes its modulus and (·)∗ denotes the
conjugation.
3II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Communication Scenario
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Fig. 1. Covert communications network model.
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a wireless communication
scenario, where Alice (i.e., the transmitter) wants to transmit
information covertly to Bob, while trying to hide herself
from Willie (i.e., the warden). Meanwhile, Willie is to detect
Alice’s transmission by observing the wireless environment.
We assume the wireless channels within our system model are
subject to independent quasi-static Rayleigh fading with equal
block length, which means that all the channel coefficients
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) circularly
symmetric complex Gaussian random variables with zero-
mean and unit-variance. Time is slotted and the quasi-static
Rayleigh fading channel coefficient remains fixed for a slot.
Alice and Willie are assumed to have a single antenna, while
besides the single receiving antenna, Bob uses an additional
antenna for transmission of AN in order to deliberately confuse
Willie. The channel from Bob to Alice, Bob to Willie, Bob to
Bob, Alice to Bob, or Alice to Willie, is denoted by hj and the
mean value of |hj |2 is denoted by λj , where the subscript j can
be ba, bw, bb, ab, aw, respectively, corresponding to different
channels. In this work, from a conservative point of view we
assume that λj is publicly known, since, for example, Willie
can possibly know the location of Bob and the potential area
or location (e.g., a building) of Alice.
In order to achieve the ultimate goal of hiding the presence
of Alice, in the considered scenario as a base station Bob
broadcasts pilots periodically in order to enable Alice’s estima-
tion of the channel from Bob to Alice (i.e., hba). Meanwhile,
Willie can estimate the channel from Bob to Willie (i.e.,
hbw), since the pilots transmitted by Bob are publicly known.
Considering channel reciprocity, we assume the channel from
Alice to Bob is the same as hba. Since Alice does not transmit
any pilots, it is assumed that Willie does not known haw.
To eliminate the requirement that Bob has to know hab for
decoding and avoid the feedback from Alice to Bob, in this
work we consider the CIPC at Alice, in which Alice varies its
transmit power as per hab such that Pa|hab|2 is a fixed value,
i.e.,
Pa|hab|2 = Q, (1)
where Pa is the transmit power of Alice. Following [29], we
note that our current analysis in this work is significantly
different from [29], although the considered scenario is similar.
This is due to the following two facts. The first fact is that in
[29] it is assumed that Willie knows the channel from Alice
to Willie (i.e., haw), while in this section we assume that haw
is unknown to Willie (since Alice did not transmit any signal
before the covert transmission). The second fact is that in this
work we adopt the CIPC at Alice, while in [29] a fixed power
is adopted at Alice.
It should be noted that the proposed CIPC scheme is to
achieve covert communications in wireless fading channels
without the need for Alice to transmit training signals for Bob
to perform channel estimation. This can ensure the existence
of Alice is hidden from being detected. Meanwhile, using
the constant transmit power scheme commonly requires Alice
to transmit training signals for Bob to estimate the channel,
which easily reveals Alice’ s existence. Therefore it is not
appropriate to include constant transmit power scheme for
comparison.
Considering some specific quality of service (QoS) require-
ments, we consider that the transmission throughput from
Alice to Bob is fixed and predetermined, which is denoted
by R. As such, transmission from Alice to Bob incurs outage
when Cab < R, where Cab is the channel capacity from Alice
to Bob. Then, the transmission outage probability is given by
δ = P [Cab < R]. (2)
As such, in this work we adopt the effective transmission
throughput as the main performance metric for the commu-
nication from Alice to Bob.
Next, we detail the transmission from Alice to the full-
duplex Bob and derive the associated transmission outage
probability. As a practical technique, the full-duplex radio has
been widely explored in wireless communications (e.g., [30],
[31]). For example, using a full-duplex receiver to generate
AN for security enhancement has been widely examined the
context of physical layer security (e.g., [29], [32], [33]).
Similarly to [29], we consider a full-duplex receiver Bob who
simultaneously receives covert information signal from Alice
and transmits AN with a random power to confuse the warden
Willie on detecting the covert transmission. Generating AN by
the full-duplex Bob enables varying the presence and amount
of uncertainty at Willie on demand, which leads to that the
covert communication between Alice and Bob is fully under
the control of Alice and Bob. When Alice transmits the covert
information, the signal received at the full-duplex Bob is given
by
yb[i] =
√
Pahabxa[i] +
√
φPbhbbvb[i] + nb[i], (3)
where xa is the signal transmitted by Alice, and nb[i] is
the AWGN at Bob with σ2b as its variance, i.e., nb[i] ∼
CN (0, σ2b ), vb is the AN signal transmitted by Bob satisfying
E[vb[i]v
†
b[i]] = 1, hbb denotes the self-interference channel
at Bob (i.e., the channel between Bob’s transmitting antenna
and Bob’s receiving antenna), and Pb is Bob’s transmit power
of the AN signal. In this work, we adopt a generalized self-
interference cancellation model, in which the self-interference
4can be fully cancelled (i.e., φ = 0) or cannot be fully
cancelled (i.e., 0 < φ ≤ 1), where φ in (3) denotes the self-
interference cancellation coefficient [34]. In practice, the self-
interference may not be fully cancelled due to the fact that self-
interference channel may not be perfectly estimated in some
specific scenarios [35]. We note that 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1 corresponds
to different self-interference cancellation levels [36]. In order
to remove the impact of the phase in the complex channel
coefficient, Alice has to pre-process the transmitted signal xa
as
xa =
h∗ab
|hab|xr, (4)
where xr is the raw information signal satisfying
E[xa[i]x
†
a[i]] = 1, i = 1, 2, . . . , n is the index of each
channel use.
In order to create uncertainty at Willie, in this work we
assume that Pb changes randomly from slot to slot [17], [37]
and and follows a continuous uniform distribution over the
interval [0, Pmaxb ] with pdf given by
fPb(x) =
{
1
Pmax
b
if 0 ≤ x ≤ Pmaxb ,
0, otherwise.
(5)
Since Willie possesses the knowledge of hbw in the slot under
consideration, for a constant transmit power at Bob, it is
straightforward for him to detect the covert transmission when
the additional power (on top of his receiver noise power) is
received. The purpose of introducing randomness in Bob’s
transmit power is to create uncertainty in Willie’s received
power, such that Willie is unsure whether an increase in his
received power is due to Alice’s transmission or simply due to
a variation in Bob’s transmit power of the AN signal. We note
that we consider the uniform distribution as an initial example
and other distributions will be explored in our future works.
B. Detection Performance at Willie
In the considered communication scenario, Willie is to infer
the presence of Alice by detecting the wireless transmission
from Alice to Bob. As such, Willie has a binary detection
problem, in which Alice does not transmit information to
Bob in the null hypothesis H0 but it does in the alternative
hypothesis H1. The ultimate goal for Willie is to detect
whether his observation comes from H0 or H1 by applying
some specific decision rule. The detection performance of
Willie is normally measured by the detection error probability,
which is defined as
Pe , π0α+ π1β, (6)
where P(H1) = π0 is the probability that Alice transmits
a covert message, P(H0) = π1 is the probability that Alice
does not transmit a covert message, α = P(D1|H0) is the
false alarm rate and β = P(D0|H1) is the miss detection rate,
while D1 and D0 are the binary decisions that infer whether
Alice transmits information to Bob or not, respectively.
From a conservative point of view, in this work we consider
the worst-case scenario for Alice and Bob, where Willie
has the ability to develop the detection strategy and the
optimal detection threshold on it. As per [12], [17], Pe ≥
min{π0, π1}(α+ β). As such, Alice can achieve covert com-
munication, for any ǫ > 0, min{π0, π1}ξ ≥ min{π0, π1} − ǫ
for n sufficiently large, where ξ is the total error probability,
which is given by
ξ = α+ β, (7)
and ǫ ∈ [0, 1] is a predetermined value to specify the covert
communication constraint.
Next, we derive the false alarm and miss detection rates
at Willie, based on which we derive the optimal detection
threshold that minimizes the total error probability. We fo-
cus on one communication slot, where Willie has to decide
whether Alice transmitted to Bob, or not. Thus Willie faces
a binary hypothesis testing problem. The composite received
signal model at Willie is given by
yw[i]=
{ √
Pbhbwvb[i] + nw[i], H0,√
Pahawxa[i] +
√
Pbhbwvb[i] + nw[i], H1.
(8)
In this work we assume that Willie employs a radiometer as
his detection test [16]. Considering the infinite blocklength,
i.e., n→∞, we have
T , lim
n→∞
1
n
T (n)=
{
Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w , H0,
Pa|haw|2 + Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w , H1.
(9)
Then, the decision rule embedded in the detector at Willie is
given by
T
D1
≷
D0
τ, (10)
where τ is the detection threshold for T , which will be
optimally determined in order to minimize the total error
probability.
III. TRUNCATED CHANNEL INVERSION POWER CONTROL
SCHEME
In this section, we examine the possibility and performance
of covert communications by utilizing AN generated by the
full-duplex Bob (i.e., the receiver), since this AN can lead to
a certain amount of uncertainty at Willie. Generating AN by
the full-duplex Bob enables varying the presence and amount
of uncertainty at Willie on demand, which leads to that the
covert communication between Alice and Bob is fully under
the control of Alice and Bob.
Considering a practical scenario, the truncated CIPC scheme
is considered at Alice in this section, where Alice can only
transmit covert information when the quality of the channel
from Alice to Bob (i.e., |hab|2) is greater than some specific
value [38]. As such, Alice’s transmit power is given by
Pa =
{
Q
|hab|2
, |hab|2 ≥ QPmaxa ,
0, |hab|2 < QPmaxa ,
(11)
where Pmaxa is the maximum power constraint at Alice. As per
(11), we note that Alice can transmit the covert message when
|hab|2 ≥ Q/Pmaxa is met. We denote this necessary condition
as C. As such, Alice can transmit xa to Bob whenever
condition C is met. Considering quasi-static Rayleigh fading,
5the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of |hab|2 is given
by F|hab|2(x) = 1 − e−x/λab and thus the probability that C
is guaranteed is given by
PC = exp
{
− Q
λabPmaxa
}
. (12)
A. Detection Performance at Willie
As discussed before, Alice can transmit covert message
when condition C is guaranteed. In the truncated CIPC
scheme, we assume that Alice will transmit a covert mes-
sage with probability 1/2 when C is true. As per (12), the
probabilities P(H1) and P(H0) are, respectively, given by
P(H1) = π1 = 1
2
PC
=
1
2
exp
{
− Q
λabPmaxa
}
, (13)
and
P(H0) = π0
= 1− 1
2
exp
{
− Q
λabPmaxa
}
. (14)
Following the decision rule given in (10), we derive the
false alarm and miss detection rates at Willie in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1: The false alarm and miss detection rates at
Willie are derived in (15) and (16), respectively.
α =


1, τ < σ2w,
1− τ−σ2wPmax
b
|hbw|2
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
0, τ > ν,
(15)
where
ν , Pmaxb |hbw|2 + σ2w, (17)
and the exponential integral function Ei(·) is given by
Ei(x) = −
∫ ∞
−x
e−t
t
dt. (18)
Proof: Following (9) and (10), and noting that H0 can
happen regardless of whether the condition C is guaranteed,
the false alarm rate is given by
α = P [Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w > τ ∣∣C]+ P [Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w > τ ∣∣C′]
= P [Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w > τ]
=


1, τ < σ2w,∫ Pmaxb
τ−σ2w
|hbw |
2
fPb(x)dx, σ
2
w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
0, τ > ν,
=


1, τ < σ2w,∫ Pmaxb
τ−σ2w
|hbw |
2
1
Pmax
b
dx, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
0, τ > ν.
(19)
Then, solving the integral in (19) leads to the desired result
in (15).
As per (9) and (10), the miss detection rate is given by
β = P [Pa|haw|2 + Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w < τ ∣∣C]
= P
[
Q|haw|2
|hab|2 + Pb|hbw|
2 + σ2w < τ
∣∣C]
=


0, τ < σ2w,
P−1
C
P
[
Pb <
τ−σ2w−Q|haw|
2/|hab|
2
|hbw|2
]
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
P−1
C
P
[
|haw|
2
|hab|2
<
τ−σ2w−Pb|hbw|
2
Q
]
, τ > ν,
(20)
Following (20), we achieve the desired result in (16) after
some algebra manipulations.
We note that the false alarm and miss detection rates derived
in Theorem 1 are for an arbitrary detection threshold τ . In
practice, Willie will determine the optimal detection threshold
that minimizes the detection error probability given in (6).
Considering that the probabilities P(H1) and P(H0) are not
functions of the detection threshold at Willie, the optimal
detection threshold is also the one that minimizes the total
error probability (i.e., α + β) given by (7), which is derived
in the following theorem.
Proposition 1: For the decision rule given in (10), Willie’s
optimal threshold that minimizes the total error probability is
derived as
τ∗ = ν, (21)
and the corresponding minimum total error probability is given
by
ξ∗ = 1−
Qλaw exp
(
Q
Pmaxa λab
)
Pmaxb λab|hbw|2
× (22)[
Ei
(
−P
max
b |hbw|2λab +Qλaw
Pmaxa λawλab
)
−Ei
(
− Q
Pmaxa λab
)]
.
where ν = Pmaxb |hbw|2 + σ2w as defined in (17).
Proof: As per (7), (15), and (16), the total error proba-
bility at Willie is given by (23).
We first note that ξ = 1 is the worst case scenario for
Willie and thus Willie does not set τ < σ2w . As per (22), for
σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν the total error probability ξ is a monotonically
decreasing function of τ . Thus, Willie will set ν as the
threshold to minimize ξ in this case. For τ > ν, we have
∂ξ
∂τ
=
Qλaw exp
(
Q
Pmaxa λab
)
Pmaxb |hbw|2λab
[g(−κ1)− g(−κ2)] , (24)
where
g(x) ,
ex
x
, (25)
κ1 ,
(τ − σ2w)λab +Qλaw
Pmaxa λawλab
,
κ2 ,
(τ − ν)λab +Qλaw
Pmaxa λawλab
.
In order to check the sign of g(−κ1) − g(−κ2) in (24), we
derive the first derivative of g(x) with respect to x as
∂g(x)
∂x
=
ex(x− 1)
x2
. (26)
6β =


0, τ < σ2w,
τ−σ2w
Pmax
b
|hbw|2
− Qλaw exp
(
Q
Pmaxa λab
)
Pmax
b
λab|hbw|2
[
Ei
(
− (τ−σ2w)λab+QλawPmaxa λawλab
)
− Ei
(
− QPmaxa λab
)]
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
1− Qλaw exp
(
Q
Pmaxa λab
)
Pmax
b
|hbw|2λab
[
Ei
(
− (τ−σ2w)λab+QλawPmaxa λawλab
)
− Ei
(
− (τ−ν)λab+QλawPmaxa λawλab
) ]
, τ > ν,
(16)
ξ =


1, τ < σ2w,
1− Qλaw exp
(
Q
Pmaxa λab
)
Pmax
b
λab|hbw|2
[
Ei
(
− (τ−σ2w)λab+QλawPmaxa λawλab
)
− Ei
(
− QPmaxa λab
)]
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
1− Qλaw exp
(
Q
Pmaxa λab
)
Pmax
b
λab|hbw|2
[
Ei
(
− (τ−σ2w)λab+QλawPmaxa λawλab
)
− Ei
(
− (τ−ν)λab+QλawPmaxa λawλab
)]
, τ > ν.
(23)
As per (26) we can see that ∂g(x)/∂x < 0 for x < 0. Noting
that κ1 > κ2, we have g(−κ1) − g(−κ2) > 0. Noting that
κ1 > κ2, the value of the term g(−κ1) − g(−κ2) is larger
than 0, which leads to the value of ∂ξ/∂τ > 0. As such, ξ is
a monotonically increasing function of τ based on (23), which
indicates that Willie will try to set ν as the threshold again
to minimize ξ under this case. We also note that for the two
cases, i.e., σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν and τ > ν, setting τ = ν can achieve
the same total error probability. As such, we can conclude that
the optimal detection threshold is τ .
Following Theorem 1 and Proposition 1, we note that
although the noise power at Willie i.e., σ2w appears in the
expressions of the false alarm rate, miss detection rate, and
the optimal detection threshold, it does not affect the minimum
total error probability, ξ∗, at Willie. This is due to the fact that
Willie knows σ2w and thus he can adjust the optimal detection
threshold accordingly to counteract the impact of σ2w. We also
note that for τ∗ = ν the false alarm rate is zero, which means
that Willie adjusts the detection threshold to force the false
alarm rate being zero in order to minimize the total error
probability. This is achievable, since as assumed Willie knows
the value range of Bob’s transmit power of the AN signal (i.e.,
the maximum value of Pb, which is P
max
b ).
B. Transmission from Alice to Bob
In this subsection, we detail the transmission from Alice
to the full-duplex Bob and derive the associated transmission
outage probability.
Following (3), the signal to interference plus noise ratio
(SINR) at Bob used to decode xa is given by
γb =
Pa|hab|2
φPb|hbb|2 + σ2b
=
Q
φPb|hbb|2 + σ2b
, (27)
since Alice varies its transmit power as per hab such that
Pa|hab|2 = Q. Due to the randomness in |hbb|2 and Pb,
we note that the residual error after self-interference cancel-
lation is complex Gaussian and its variance is proportional to
Pb|hbb|2. Then, the transmission from Alice to Bob will incur
outage when Cab < R, where Cab = log2(1 + γb) is the
channel capacity from Alice to Bob and R is the fixed trans-
mission throughput from Alice to Bob. We note that γb cannot
be larger than Q/σ2b , which is achieved when φ = 0 (i.e.,
when the self-interference can be fully cancelled). As such, in
order to guarantee the transmission outage probability being
less than one, we to have to ensure R < log2
(
1 +Q/σ2b
)
,
which is assumed to be true in this section. We next derive
the transmission outage probability from Alice to Bob in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2: The transmission outage probability from
Alice to the full-duplex Bob is derived as
δ = e−η + ηEi(−η), (28)
where
η =
Q− (2R − 1)σ2b
(2R − 1)λbbφPmaxb
. (29)
Proof: Based on the definition of the transmission outage
probability given in (2), we have
δ = P {log2 (1 + γb) ≤ R}
= P
{
Q
φPb|hbb|2 + σ2b
≤ 2R − 1
}
=
∫ Pmaxb
0
∫ +∞
Q−(2R−1)σ2
b
(2R−1)φy
f|hbb|2(x)fPb (y)dxdy
=
∫ Pmaxb
0
∫ +∞
Q−(2R−1)σ2
b
(2R−1)φy
exp
(
− xλbb
)
λbbPmaxb
dxdy
=
1
Pmaxb
∫ Pmaxb
0
exp
{
−Q− (2
R − 1)σ2b
(2R − 1)λbbφy
}
dy
= exp
(
− Q− (2
R − 1)σ2b
(2R − 1)λabφPmaxb
)
+
Q− (2R − 1)σ2b
(2R − 1)λabφPmaxb
×
Ei
(
− Q− (2
R − 1)σ2b
(2R − 1)λabφPmaxb
)
. (30)
Following (30), we achieve the desired result in (28) after
some algebra manipulations.
Following Proposition 2, we determine some properties of
the transmission outage probability in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: The transmission outage probability δ is a
monotonically decreasing function of η, which leads to the
fact that δ monotonically decreases with Q but increases with
Pmaxb .
Proof: In order to determine the monotonicity of δ with
respect to η, we derive its first derivative as
∂δ
∂η
= −2e−η + Ei(−η). (31)
7We note that η ≥ 0 as per its definition given in (29) and thus
we have ∂δ/∂η ≤ 0 due to −2e−η < 0 and Ei(−η) < 0,
which indicates that δ monotonically decreases with η. Again,
as per the definition of η in (29), we can see that η is a
monotonically increasing function of Q but a monotonically
decreasing function of Pmaxb , which completes the proof of
Corollary 1.
C. Optimization of Effective Covert Throughput
In this subsection, we examine the maximum ECT achieved
in the considered scenario with the full-duplex Bob subject to
a certain covert communication constraint. In this scenario,
Willie knows hbw, which is the reason that the detection
performance (e.g., false alarm rate, miss detection rate, optimal
detection threshold, and the minimum total error probability)
at Willie depends on hbw. However, Alice does not know
hbw and thus cannot guarantee the covert communication
constraint min{π0, π1}ξ∗(|haw|2, Q) ≥ min{π0, π1} − ǫ. As
such, in the following proposition we present the expected
value of ξ∗(|haw|2, Q) over all realizations of |hbw|2, which
is denoted by ξ∗(Q), and then we use min{π0, π1}ξ∗(Q) ≥
min{π0, π1}−ǫ as the covert communication constraint in this
section.
The optimization problem at Alice of maximizing the ECT
subject to a certain covert communication constraint is given
by
Q∗ =argmax
Q
Rc (32)
s. t. min{π0, π1}ξ∗(Q) ≥ min{π0, π1} − ǫ,
where Rc is the effective rate from Alice to Bob (without
consider the factor of 1/2), which is given by
Rc = R(1− δ)PC, (33)
and ξ∗(Q) is the expected value of the minimum total error
probability ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q) over all realizations of |hbw|2, which
is given by
ξ∗(Q) =
∫ ∞
0
ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q)e
−
|hbw |
2
λbw
λbw
d|hbw|2 (34)
= 1−
∫ ∞
0
Qλawexp
(
Q
Pmaxa λab
− |hbw|2λbw
)
Pmaxb λabλbw |hbw|2
×[
Ei
(
−P
max
b |hbw|2λab+Qλaw
Pmaxa λawλab
)
−Ei
(
− Q
Pmaxa λab
)]
d|hbw|2.
The objective function Rc = R(1 − δ)PC in (32) is not
a monotonic function of Q. This is because that the out-
age δ is a monotonically decreasing function of Q as per
Corollary 1 and PC is a monotonically decreasing function
of Q as per(12). The optimization problem (32) can be
solved by numerical search in the set of Q which satisfies
1/2 exp(−Q/(λabPmaxa ))[1− ξ∗(Q)] ≤ ǫ.
IV. CONVENTIONAL CHANNEL INVERSION POWER
CONTROL SCHEME
In this section, we consider the conventional CIPC scheme
in the context of covert communications. The conventional
CIPC scheme is a special case of truncated CIPC scheme
with Pmaxa → ∞. However, we note the fact that the false
alarm and miss detection rates at Willie for the conventional
CIPC scheme cannot be directly obtained from that of the
truncated CIPC scheme by setting Pmaxa → ∞, due to the
involved Ei functions. The complex Ei functions involved in
the performance analysis on the truncated CIPC scheme leads
to another fact that the impact of some system parameters
(e.g., Pmaxb ) cannot be clarified in the last section, even in
the asymptotic scenario with Pmaxa → ∞. These two facts
motivates us to consider the conventional CIPC scheme and
directly analyze its performance in this section, based on
which we are able to analytically clarify the impact of some
system parameters on the CIPC schemes and the comparison
result between the truncated and conventional CIPC schemes.
A. Detection Performance at Willie
In the conventional CIPC scheme, we assume that Alice will
transmit a covert message with probability 1/2, since Alice
can always transmit covert information and the uninformative
priors π0 = π1 = 1/2 means a random guess of Alice’s covert
transmission at Willie. As such, the probability P(H1) and
P(H0) are, respectively, given by
P(H1) = π1 = 1
2
, (35)
and
P(H0) = π0 = 1
2
. (36)
Following the decision rule given in (10), we derive the false
alarm and miss detection rates at Willie in the conventional
CIPC scheme with the full-duplex Bob in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: The false alarm and miss detection rates at
Willie are derived in (37) and (38), respectively.
α =


1, τ < σ2w,
1− τ−σ2wPmax
b
|hbw|2
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
0, τ > ν,
(37)
where we recall that ν is defined in (17).
Proof: Following (9) and (10), the false alarm rate is given
by
α = P [Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w > τ]
=


1, τ < σ2w,∫ Pmaxb
τ−σ2w
|hbw |
2
fPb(x)dx, σ
2
w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
0, τ > ν,
=


1, τ < σ2w,∫ Pmaxb
τ−σ2w
|hbw |
2
1
Pmax
b
dx, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
0, τ > ν.
(39)
Then, solving the integral in (39) leads to the desired result
in (37).
8β =


0, τ < σ2w,
1
Pmax
b
|hbw|2
(
τ − σ2w − Qλawλab ln
(
1 +
(τ−σ2w)λab
Qλaw
))
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
1− QλawPmax
b
|hbw|2λab
ln
(
1 +
Pmaxb |hbw|
2
τ+Qλaw/λab−ν
)
, τ > ν,
(38)
ξ =


1, τ < σ2w,
1− QλawPmax
b
|hbw|2λab
ln
(
1 +
(τ−σ2w)λab
Qλaw
)
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
1− QλawPmax
b
|hbw|2λab
ln
(
1 +
Pmaxb |hbw|
2
τ+Qλaw/λab−ν
)
, τ > ν.
(43)
As per (9) and (10), the miss detection rate is given by
β = P [Pa|haw|2 + Pb|hbw|2 + σ2w < τ]
=


0, τ < σ2w,
P
[
Pb <
τ−σ2w−Q|haw|
2/|hab|
2
|hbw|2
]
, σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν,
P
[
|haw|
2
|hab|2
<
τ−σ2w−Pb|hbw|
2
Q
]
, τ > ν,
(40)
Following (40), we achieve the desired result in (38) after
some algebra manipulations.
We note that the false alarm and miss detection rates derived
in Theorem 2 are for an arbitrary detection threshold τ . In
practice, Willie will determine the optimal detection threshold
that minimizes the total error probability, which is derived in
the following theorem.
Proposition 3: For the decision rule given in (10), Willie’s
optimal threshold that minimizes the total error probability is
derived as
τ∗ = ν, (41)
and the corresponding minimum total error probability is given
by
ξ∗ = 1− Qλaw
Pmaxb λab|hbw|2
ln
(
1 +
Pmaxb λab|hbw|2
Qλaw
)
. (42)
where ν = Pmaxb |hbw|2 + σ2w as defined in (17).
Proof: As per (7), (37), and (38), the total error proba-
bility at Willie is given by (43).
We first note that ξ = 1 is the worst case scenario for
Willie and thus Willie does not set τ < σ2w. As per (43), for
σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν the total error probability ξ is a monotonically
decreasing function of τ . Thus, Willie will set ν as the
threshold to minimize ξ in this case. For τ > ν, ξ is an
monotonically increasing function of τ based on (43), which
indicates that Willie will try to set ν as the threshold again
to minimize ξ under this case. We also note that for the two
cases, i.e., σ2w ≤ τ ≤ ν and τ > ν, setting τ = ν can achieve
the same total error probability. As such, we can conclude that
the optimal detection threshold is τ .
B. Optimization of Effective Covert Throughput
In this subsection, we examine the maximum ECT achieved
in the conventional CIPC scheme. The procedures for solving
the optimization promblem are similar to that in Section III.C.
Proposition 4: The expected value of the minimum total
error probability ξ∗ over all realizations of hbw is derived as
ξ∗(Q)=1− 1
4ϕ(Q)
{
− 8
ϕ(Q)
3F3
(
[1, 1, 1], [2, 2, 2],
1
ϕ(Q)
)
+
4ςEi
(
− 1
ϕ(Q)
)
+ 4 ln(ϕ(Q))
(
− Ei
(
− 1
ϕ(Q)
)
−
ln(ϕ(Q))
2
+ ς
)
+ π2 − 2ς2 − 2
}
, (44)
where ϕ(Q) , Pmaxb λabλbw/(Qλaw), 3F3([·, ·, ·], [·, ·, ·], ·) is
Gauss hypergeometric functions and ς is the Euler constant.
Proof: Following (42), the expected value of
ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q) with respect with |hbw|2 is given by
ξ∗(Q) =
∫ ∞
0
ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q)e
−
|hbw |
2
λbw
λbw
d|hbw|2
= 1− Qλaw
Pmaxb λabλbw
∫ ∞
0
e
−
|hbw|
2
λbw
|hbw|2 ×
ln
(
1 +
Pmaxb λab|hbw|2
Qλaw
)
d|hbw|2, (45)
and solving the integral in (45) with respect to |hbw|2 leads
to the desired result in (44).
The optimization problem at Alice of maximizing the ECT
subject to a certain covert communication constraint is given
by
Q∗ =argmax
Q
Rc (46)
s. t. min{π0, π1}ξ∗(Q) ≥ min{π0, π1} − ǫ.
where π0 = π1 = 1/2 as defined in (36) and (35), respec-
tively. We note that the transmission outage probability of the
conventional CIPC scheme is the same as that given in (28)
of the truncated CIPC scheme and we have PC = 1 in the
conventional CIPC scheme.
We next determine the solution to the optimization problem
given in (46) and derive the maximum ECT in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3: For given Pmaxb and ǫ, the solution to (46), i.e.,
the optimal value of Q that maximizes the ECT Rc subject to
ξ∗(Q) ≥ 1− 2ǫ, is derived as
Q∗ = Qǫ, (47)
9and the achieved maximum ECT is given by
R∗c = R(1− e−η
∗ − η∗Ei(−η∗)), (48)
where Qǫ is the solution to ξ∗(Q) = 1 − 2ǫ of Q and η∗ is
given by
η∗ =
Q∗ − (2R − 1)σ2b
(2R − 1)λbbφPmaxb
. (49)
Proof: As per Corollary 1, the transmission outage prob-
ability δ is a monotonically decreasing function of Q, which
leads to the fact that the ECT Rc monotonically increases
with Q. Following this fact, we next prove another fact
that the expected minimum total error probability ξ∗(Q) is
a monotonically increasing function of Q. These two facts
indicate that the optimal value of Q (i.e., the solution to (46))
is the one that ensures ξ∗(Q) = 1− 2ǫ. To this end, we next
prove that ξ∗(Q) is a monotonically decreasing function of Q.
Following (45) and using the Leibniz integral rule, we derive
the first derivative of ξ∗(Q) with respect to t as
∂ξ∗(Q)
∂Q
=
∂
∂Q


∫ ∞
0
ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q)e
−
|hbw |
2
λbw
λbw
d|hbw|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
ξ∗(Q)


=
∫ ∞
0
∂ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q)
∂Q
e
−
|hbw |
2
λbw
λbw
d|hbw|2. (50)
Considering e
− x
λbw /λbw > 0 in (50), we could conclude
that ∂ξ∗(Q)/∂Q < 0 if we could prove ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q) is a
decreasing function of Q. Following (42), we have
∂ξ∗(θ)
∂θ
=
u(θ)
θ2(1 + θ)
, (51)
where
u(θ) ,
(
1 +
θλab|hbw|2
λaw
)
ln
(
1 +
θλab|hbw|2
λaw
)
−
θλab|hbw|2
λaw
, (52)
θ ,
Pmaxb
Q
. (53)
We note that the sign of ∂ξ∗(θ)/∂θ depends on the value of
u(θ). In order to determine the value range of u(θ), we first
derive the first derivative of u(θ) with respect to θ as
∂u(θ)
∂θ
=
λab|hbw|2
λaw
ln
(
1 +
θλab|hbw|2
λaw
)
> 0. (54)
Noting limθ→0 u(θ) = 0 and following (54), we can conclude
that u(θ) ≥ 0 for θ > 0, which indicates that ∂ξ∗(θ)/∂θ ≥ 0.
Noting that θ is a monotonically decreasing function of Q, we
can conclude that ξ∗(|hbw|2, Q) is a decreasing function of Q.
This completes the proof of this theorem.
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Fig. 2. Willie’s false alarm rate α, miss detection rate β, and total error
probability ξ versus threshold τ for covert communications in the truncated
CIPC scheme, where Q = 1, Pmax
b
= 0 dB, Pmaxa = 0 dB, |hbw|
2
= 1,
and σ2w = 0 dB.
Corollary 2: As Bob’s maximum transmit power of the AN
signal approaches infinity (i.e., Pmaxb → ∞), the achievable
maximum ECR approaches a fixed value, which is given by
lim
Pmax
b
→∞
R∗c = R
(
1− exp
(
− 1
(2R − 1)λabφθǫ
)
+
Ei
(
− 1
(2R−1)λabφθǫ
)
(2R − 1)λabφθǫ
)
. (55)
Proof: As per (42) and (53), we note that the solution of
θǫ to ξ∗(θ) = 1 − 2ǫ does not affect by the value of Pmaxb .
As such, we still have tǫ as the solution to ξ∗(θ) = 1− 2ǫ as
Pmaxb → ∞. Then, substituting Q∗ = Pmaxb /θǫ into (49) we
have
lim
Pmax
b
→∞
η∗ =
1
(2R − 1)λbbφθǫ . (56)
Then, substituting (56) into (48) we achieve the desired result
in (55) after some algebra manipulations.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first present numerical results to verify
our analysis on the covert communications in the considered
two schemes (i.e., conventional CIPC and truncated CIPC).
Then, we provide a thorough performance examination of
the covert communications in each scheme. Based on our
examination, we draw many useful insights and guidelines
on how to design and implement covert communications in
practical scenarios. Without other statements, we set λab =
λaw = λbb = λbw = 1.
Fig. 2 illustrates the false alarm rate α, miss detection
rate β, and total error probability ξ versus Willie’s detection
threshold τ in the truncated CIPC scheme. As expected,
we first observe that the simulated curves precisely match
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Fig. 3. Willie’s false alarm rate α, miss detection rate β, and total error
probability ξ versus threshold τ for covert communications in the conventional
CIPC scheme, where Q = 1, Pmax
b
= 0 dB, |hbw|
2
= 1, and σ2w = 0 dB.
the theoretical ones, which confirms the correctness of our
Theorem 1. We also observe that there is indeed an optimal
value of τ that minimizes ξ and this value satisfies τ∗ = ν,
which verifies the correctness of our Proposition 1.
In Fig. 3, we plot the false alarm rate α, miss detection
rate β, and total error probability ξ versus Willie’s detection
threshold τ in the conventional CIPC scheme. As expected, in
this figure we first observe that the simulated curves precisely
match the theoretical ones, which confirms the correctness of
our Theorem 2. We also observe that the total error probability
ξ dramatically varies with the detection threshold τ , which
demonstrates the necessity of optimizing τ by Willie and the
importance of our Proposition 3, which derives the optimal
detection threshold minimizes ξ in a closed-form expression.
Finally, we observe that the optimal value of τ is equal to ν,
which simultaneously forces the false alarm rate α at Willie
being zero and minimizes the miss detection rate β.
In Fig. 4, we plot the maximum ECT R∗c versus Bob’s
maximum transmit power of the AN signal Pmaxb with dif-
ferent values of the self-interference cancellation parameter
φ. In this figure, we first observe that R∗c monotonically
increases as Pmaxb increases, which demonstrates that the
covert communications from Alice becomes easier when Bob
has more power to transmit AN to aid. However, we also note
that as Pmaxb → ∞ the maximum ECT R∗c approaches the
upper bound given in our Corollary 2. Intuitively, this can be
explained by the fact that the transmitted AN not only creates
interference at Willie but also leads to self-interference at Bob.
In this figure, we also observe that the upper bound on the
achieved R∗c decreases significantly as φ increases, since a
larger φ indicates a larger self-interference at Bob.
In Fig. 5, we plot the maximum ECT R∗c , which is achieved
by the optimal Q and R, versus Bob’s maximum transmit
power of the AN signal Pmaxb . Since R has no effect on the
detection performance of Willie, we can obtain the optimal R
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Fig. 4. Maximum ECT R∗c versus Bob’s maximum transmit power P
max
b
under different value of φ in the conventional CIPC scheme, where ǫ = 0.10
and σ2
b
= 0 dB.
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Fig. 5. Maximum ECT R∗c versus Bob’s maximum transmit power P
max
b
optimized over Q and R, where φ = 0.1, ǫ = 0.01, Pmaxa = 10 dB, and
σ2
b
= 0 dB.
by a numerical search, after obtaining the optimal Q. In this
figure, we first observe that R∗c achieved by the truncated CIPC
scheme first increases and then decreases as Pmaxb increases,
which indicates that there is an optimal value of Pmaxb that
maximizes R∗c . This due to the fact a small P
max
b cannot
cause enough uncertainty at Willie to hide Alice’s covert
transmission, while a large Pmaxb may have greater impact on
increasing the interference at Bob than increasing uncertainty
at Willie (since Pmaxa is predefined in the truncated CIPC
scheme). Meanwhile, we also observe that the R∗c achieved by
the conventional CIPC scheme continuously increases as Pmaxb
increases, which is due to the fact that in the conventional
11
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
Fig. 6. Maximum ECT R∗c versus Alice’s maximum transmit power P
max
a
optimized over Q and R under different value of ǫ, where Pmax
b
= 20 dB,
σ2
b
= −10 dB, and φ = 0.1.
CIPC scheme we can vary Q to counteract the impact of
Pmaxb on the detection performance at Willie (can be seen
from Corollary 2) and the outage probability converges to a
specific constant value as Pmaxb increases (can be seen from
(56)). Furthermore, in this figure we observe that the maximum
value of R∗c for the truncated CIPC scheme is higher than that
for the conventional CIPC scheme, which demonstrates that
the truncated CIPC scheme can outperform the conventional
CIPC scheme. Intuitively, this is due to the fact that increasing
Pmaxa can decrease the detection error probability at Willie
(i.e., it becomes easier for Willie to detection Alice’s covert
transmission), although increasing Pmaxa always increases the
effective rate from Alice to Bob.
In Fig. 6, we plot the maximum ECT R∗c , achieved by the
conventional and truncated CIPC schemes with the optimal Q
and R, versus the maximum transmit power at Alice Pmaxa
with different levels of covert communication constraints (i.e.,
different values of ǫ). In this figure, we first observe that R∗c
achieved by the truncated CIPC scheme first increases and
then decreases as Pmaxa increases, which indicates that there
is an optimal value of Pmaxa that maximizes R
∗
c . This can
be explained by the fact that increasing Pmaxa simultaneously
decreases the detection error probability at Willie and the
probability that Alice can transmit covert information to Bob
(i.e., PC), which means that Pmaxa has a two-side impact
on the considered covert communications. This observation
indicates, on top of optimizing the fixed value Q, we also
have to optimally design the parameter Pmaxa in order to
achieve the optimal performance of CIPC in the context of
covert communications. This is different from optimizing the
performance of CIPC in point-to-point communications, where
the performance of CIPC monotonically increases with Pmaxa
and thus solely optimizing Q is sufficient. We also observe
that, as Pmaxa increases, the R
∗
c of the truncated CIPC scheme
approaches that of the conventional CIPC scheme, which
confirms the correctness of our examinations. As expected,
we also observe that R∗c increases as ǫ increases, which
demonstrates that it is the covert communication constraint
that mainly limits R∗c .
VI. CONCLUSION
This work examined covert communications with a full-
duplex receiver over Rayleigh fading channels, in which the
transmitter Alice adopts the CIPC to transmit information to
the receiver Bob covertly while trying to hide herself from the
warden Willie. We analyzed Willie’s detection performance
limits for the considered truncated and conventional CIPC
schemes, based on which the achievable ECTs of these two
schemes were determined. Our examination shows that there
exists an optimal value of the maximum transmit power at Bob
that maximizes the ECT in the truncated CIPC scheme, while
the ECT monotonically increases and approaches an upper
bound as this maximum transmit power at Bob increases in
the conventional CIPC scheme. Our analysis and examinations
provided practical guidelines on conducting covert communi-
cations and potentially hiding a transmitter in Rayleigh fading
scenarios.
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